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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 20020220-CA 
v. 
CHARLES LEE DIVINEY, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This is an appeal from a conviction and sentence entered on pleas of guilty to 
burglary, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1999); 
aggravated assault, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1999); 
two counts of simple assault, class A and B misdemeanors, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-102 (Supp. 2000); and one count of violation of a protective order, a class A 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108 (1999) (R. 103-12; R. 291) 
(statutes attached in Addendum A). 
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) 
(2002), pursuant to the transfer of this matter from the Utah Supreme Court by order dated 
May 14, 2002.] 
'The May 14 letter notes that the transfer was made because the appeal was from 
"an order, judgement or decree of a court in a case that is not within the original appellate 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Is reference in the written judgment to "aggravated" burglary a clerical 
error which this Court may correct? 
A clerical error may be considered by this Court for the first time on appeal. See 
State v. Lorrah, 761 P.2d 1388, 1390 (Utah 1988) (noting that clerical errors have 
frequently been corrected by this Court without notice to a defendant); State v. Larson, 
758 P.2d 901, 904 (1988). To ascertain the clerical nature of the mistake, this Court will 
look to the record to harmonize the intent of the court with the written judgment. See 
Lorrah, 761 P.2d at 1389; State v. Shelby, 728 P.2d 987, 987-88 (Utah 1986). 
2. Did the trial court commit plain error in determining the amount of 
restitution owed by defendant for one victim's lost wages and personal property 
loss? 
Because defendant preserved only one of the three restitution arguments in his 
brief, two standards of review apply.2 Defendant preserved his argument regarding the 
jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court." However, the appeal was properly filed in that 
Court because it involved a "charge of a first degree felony[.]" Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(3)(i) (2002). Consequently, the appeal has not been transferred for a proper reason, and 
this Court may wish to transfer the matter to the Utah Supreme Court for a determination 
of whether they will address the appeal or pour it over to this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4). 
2Defendant claims to have preserved the entire second issue below, citing to (R. 
408:12-13; R. 292-93; and R. 410). Br. of Aplt. at 3. However, the sole citation which 
deals with the arguments raised on appeal is volume number 293, which defendant cites 
in its entirety. Id. In it, defendant objects to Deborah's claim of restitution for lost wages 
2 
"charge-off' time for which he was ordered to pay restitution (R. 293:3). This Court has 
recognized that "'the imposition of restitution is a matter left to the discretion of the [trial] 
court.'" State v. Smith, 2003 UT App 179, % 10, 72 P.3d 692 (quoting State v. Robertson, 
932 P.2d 1219, 1233 (Utah 1997), overruled on other grounds by State v. Weeks, 2002 
UT 98, f 24, 61 P.3d 1000); see also State v. Corbitt, 2003 UT App 417, % 6, Utah 
Adv. Rep. . We Mwill not disturb a trial court's restitution order 'unless it exceeds that 
prescribed by law or [the court] otherwise abused its discretion.' " State v. Bickley, 2002 
on "charge-off days based on the same argument he makes in his appellate brief (R. 
293:3). Br. of Aplt. at 18-23. He also references the installation of the burglar alarm at 
Deborah's principal address, but he presents to supporting argument (R. 293:3). Hence, 
any objection relating to that alarm was not properly preserved for appeal. See State v. 
Pugmire, 898 P.2d 271, 272-73 (Utah App. 1995); State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 360 
(Utah App. 1993) (appellate review of criminal cases in Utah requires 'that a 
contemporaneous objection or some form of specific preservation of claims of error must 
be made a part of the trial court record'") (quoting State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 
(Utah 1987). 
The remaining record cites do not contain any specific objection to the restitution 
amounts. Transcript number 408 is the sentencing transcript, and pages 12 through 13 
include only defense counsel's general objection "to the amount of restitution^]" made 
solely "for purposes of preserving our right to a [restitution] hearing" (R. 408:13). 
Transcript number 410 is the transcript from the first part of the restitution hearing 
at which the parties discovered that the reparation officer did not have all the necessary 
documentation with her and that defense counsel had not received all the documentation 
that the prosecutor had sent to him (R. 410:9-13). Consequently, the hearing was 
rescheduled without defendant having objected to any particular restitution amount. 
Transcript number 292 reflects the main body of the restitution hearing and the 
questioning of the witnesses. When the defense rested, the trial court immediately 
requested written briefs (R. 292:72-73). Defendant voiced no objections to any of the 
evidence at that point (R. 292:73-76). 
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UT App 342, K 15, 60 P-3d 582 (quoting State v. Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, If 7, 12 P.3d 
110) (additional quotations omitted); see also Corbitt, 2003 UT App. 417, t 6 ("'[T[he 
exercise of discretion in sentencing necessarily reflects the personal judgment of the court 
and the appellate court can properly find abuse only if it can be said that no reasonable 
[person] would take the view adopted by the trial court.'") (quoting State v. Gerrard, 584 
P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978)). 
Defendant did not preserve his challenges to the amounts ordered for lost wages 
generally or for personal property. Accordingly, these arguments should be reviewed 
under the plain error doctrine. To establish plain error, a defendant must show: "(0 [aln 
error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is 
harmful[.]" See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993); see also State v. 
Medina-Juarez, 2001 UT 79, % 18, 373 P.3d 187. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (1999) is relevant to the issues presented on appeal 
and is contained in its entirety in Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Despite the existence of a permanent protective order issued on May 5, 2002, 
defendant could not leave his ex-wife Deborah alone (R. 289, letter dated 1/21/01; R. 
292:10, 32-34).3 On July 5, 2000, defendant was charged with witness tampering, a third 
3Deborah is also referred to as "Debra" at various parts of the record. The State 
uses "Deborah" as it appears in the transcripts. 
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degree felony, two counts of assault, class A and B misdemeanors, and one count of 
violating a protective order, a class A misdemeanor (Case No. 001911430: 2-4). The 
offenses occurred June 14, 2000, and the victim was Deborah (id.). On July 13, 2000, 
defendant was charged in a separate case with aggravated burglary, a first degree felony, 
tampering with a witness, a third degree felony, aggravated assault, a third degree felony, 
and violation of a protective order, a class A misdemeanor (Case No. 001912025: 2-7).4 
These offenses occurred on July 11, and the victims were Deborah, and one of 
defendant's sons, Charles Lee Diviney III ["Chuck"] (id.). 
Defendant and the prosecutor reached a plea agreement in which defendant entered 
an Alford plea5 of guilty to one count of burglary, a second degree felony, one count of 
aggravated assault, a third degree felony, two counts of simple assault, class A and B 
misdemeanors, and violation of a protective order, a class A misdemeanor (R. 103-15; R. 
291). The charges were amended into a single information in this case, and the other case 
was dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement (R. 113-15; R. 291: 3-5). The prosecutor 
also agreed to "recommend no prison time[,]" to recommend "that all sentences in this 
matter run concurrent," and, "upon successful completion of probation, [to] recommend 
reduction of the charges pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3- 402 (1999) (R. 291:12). 
4The charges were consolidated as part of a plea bargain, and the first case was 
dismissed (R. 103-15; R. 291; 12). Hence, the remaining record cites herein are to the 
pleadingsin case number 001912025. 
Pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160 (1970). 
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The trial court accepted defendant's pleas and ordered preparation of a presentence 
investigation report (R. 119-21; R. 291: 12-14). Thereafter, the trial judge sentenced 
defendant to serve one-to-fifteen years in the state prison for each of the felony counts, 
and twenty-four months in jail for each of the misdemeanor counts, all sentences to run 
concurrently (R. 122-28; R. 408:8-13) (the Judgment is attached in Addendum B). The 
court then suspended the prison sentences and sentenced defendant to jail for twenty-four 
months, with the possibility of early release if he obtained treatment while in jail and if he 
was released to a treatment program (id.). The court also ordered that defendant pay 
restitution, but left the amount to be determined at a later date by AP&P (id.). 
Defense counsel moved to correct his sentence on the ground that, by statute, he 
could be incarcerated in the county jail for no more than one year, most of which he had 
served by that time (R. 132-34, 138-39). He also requested a restitution hearing to 
challenge the amount set by AP&P as restitution (R. 153-54). 
The evidentiary hearing occurred on December 17, 2001, followed by the 
prosecutor's submission of a written brief and oral argument (R. 182-83, 184-87). A 
reparation officer from Crime Victims Reparations ["CVR"], Christine Ackmann, 
testified at the hearing, together with Deborah and her son, Chuck (R. 292:2). Ms. 
Ackmann testified that CVR paid the victims a total of $ 4,661,34, and explained how 
they verified the claims and the type of things for which they had paid (R. 410: 5-7, R. 
292:7-18). Deborah testified concerning her injuries, the resulting loss of wages, and the 
impact of the offenses on her and her living conditions (R. 292: 26-41, 47-55, 58-68). 
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After the hearing, the parties were given the opportunity to submit written 
memoranda regarding the restitution amount to be ordered (R. 292: 72-73). The 
prosecutor submitted a memorandum outlining several different amounts believed to be 
owing (R. 184-87) (attached in Addendum C). Nothing appears in the record from 
defendant. Following oral argument, the trial court ordered defendant to pay to CVR a 
total of $ 4,098.42 with interest as presented in the State's memorandum, based on the 
following amounts: 
-$554.00 "for medical expenses such as co-payments and prescriptions that were 
not covered" by Deborah's health insurer; 
-$2,121.37 "for payments made [by CVR] " to Deborah for lost wages; 
-$8.00 "for payments made to [Deborah] for travel expenses," 
-$916.00 f for payments made to [Deborah] for the expense of installing an alarm 
system and the expense of quarterly fees associated with two alarm systems, and" 
-$499.05 "for payments made to Chuck . . . for lost wages." 
(R. 191-92) (emphasis added) (the order is attached in Addendum D).6 Defendant timely 
appealed (R. 194-95). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The specific facts of the charged crimes have little bearing on the issues raised by 
defendant in this appeal. The change of plea hearing transcript reflects that defendant 
pled guilty to five counts, identifying the following factual bases for each: 
6The two emphasized amounts are the amounts challenged by defendant on appeal. 
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1. Burglary, a second degree felony: 
-on July 11, 2000, defendant entered or remained unlawfully at his son 
Chuck's home with the intent to commit an assault (R. 291:10); 
2. Aggravated assault, a third degree felony: 
-on July 11, 2000, defendant assaulted his son "by the use of a dangerous 
weapon," i.e., "a tire changing implement" (R. 291:11-12); 
3. Simple assault, a class A misdemeanor: 
-on June 14, 2000, at Chuck's home, defendant "acted with unlawful force 
or violence to cause substantial bodily injury" to his ex-wife, Deborah (R. 
291:8-9); 
4. Violation of a protective order, a class A misdemeanor: 
-on June 14, 2000, at Chuck's home, defendant intentionally and 
knowingly violated a protective order after having been properly served 
with it (R. 291:9); 
5. Simple assault, a class B misdemeanor: 
-on June 14, 2000, at Chuck's home, defendant "used unlawful force or 
violence that caused or created a substantial risk of violence" to Deborah 
(R. 291:11). 
In the June 14 incident, defendant attacked Deborah while she sat in her car at her 
son Chuck's home, where she was living at the time (R. 292: 34, 35, 40, 56). He 
repeatedly beat her, attempted to drag her from the car, and attempted to enter the car (R. 
292:26, 40). During the incident, defendant inflicted upon Deborah "massive bruising" 
on her face and right arm, a laceration across her eyebrow that required stitches, and 
damage to her right thumb and her right wrist, both of which required separate surgeries 
over the following months (R. 292:26-30; St's Exhs. 1-5). An additional surgery was 
anticipated to remove a five-inch metal plate that was inserted in the wrist to stabilize it 
because of the injury inflicted by defendant (R. 292: 30-31). 
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At all times relevant to the charged incidents, Deborah worked at two jobs (R. 292: 
38). She worked part time at the Granite School District ["Granite"] and, hence, did not 
receive benefits (R. 292: 38-39; R. 289, letter dated 1/20/01). She also worked full time 
at Discover Financial Services ["Discover"] as a senior account manager (R. 292: 36, 38-
39). The latter job included paid benefits, enabling her to take paid leave for days related 
to the charged incidents in this case (R. 292: 36). Consequently, all restitution amounts 
relating to lost wages were wages lost in connection with the Granite job, not the 
Discover job (R. 292:48). 
Additional information relevant to the issues raised on appeal are included in the 
arguments. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in entering into the record a 
Judgment, Sentence and Commitment that identified the burglary charge to which 
defendant pled guilty as an "aggravated" burglary. The State agrees that inclusion of the 
term "aggravated" in the written Judgment was a clerical error which this Court should 
address and correct on appeal. The State notes, however, that the trial court imposed the 
correct statutory sentence for a burglary: one-to-fifteen years. Thus, the only correction is 
to delete the word "aggravated." 
Defendant advances three arguments which challenge the restitution amount set 
below, only one of which has been properly preserved. First, he argues that the trial 
judge overestimated the amount of lost wages Deborah incurred as a result of the injuries 
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she received, ordering defendant to pay more than was established by the evidence below. 
The State agrees that the evidence supports defendant's calculation of general damages. 
Therefore, a small adjustment in the amount ordered by the trial court should be made. 
Second, defendant argues that the adjusted amount for lost wages should be further 
adjusted for thirteen days for which Deborah received payment from CVR because of a 
claimed inability to work both of her jobs due to her injuries. He claims that twelve of 
the days were days she would not have worked both jobs, and, hence, she was not entitled 
to payment. One of those days, together with a thirteenth day, were days when one job 
was unavailable, leaving her unable to work it regardless of her injuries. This latter 
challenge was not preserved for appellate review and should not be addressed by this 
Court. Regardless, defendant fails to establish any plain error or abuse of discretion 
where the evidence supports the award of wages for all of the challenged days. 
Finally, defendant contends that the trial judge erred in calculating the amount of 
property damage Deborah suffered because of his actions. He argues that he should not 
have to reimburse her for the service payments for an alarm system located at her primary 
residence which were made following the June 14 incident because that offense occurred 
at Chuck's house. For the same reason, he claims that he should not be responsible for 
the deadbolt locks Deborah installed in her home. However, defendant's failure to raise 
these arguments below and his failure to argue plain error on appeal permits this Court to 
reject his claims outright. Moreover, Deborah was living both at her primary residence 
and with her son at the time of the incidents because of the insecurity she felt living alone 
10 
in her own home after defendant's multiple violations of the permanent protective order. 
Because defendant's inability to leave her alone was clear from the presentence report, 
the trial judge reasonably included in the restitution figure the amounts paid by Deborah 
after the first incident to secure herself from defendant when in her own home. 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
THE STATE AGREES THAT INCLUSION OF THE WORD 
"AGGRAVATED" IN THE WRITTEN JUDGMENT WAS A 
CLERICAL ERROR AND SHOULD BE CORRECTED 
Defendant argues that the trial court committed plain or clerical error in entering 
into the record a Judgment, Sentence and Commitment that reflected that defendant 
entered a guilty plea to "aggravated" burglary instead of burglary. Br. of Aplt. at 8-15. 
See Add. B. The State agrees that this was a clerical error which this Court may correct 
on appeal. See State v. Lorrah, 761 P.2d 1388, 1389 (Utah 1988); see also State v. 
Larson, 758 P.2d 901, 904 (Utah 1988). "A clerical error, as contradistinguished from 
judicial error, is not 'the deliberate result of the exercise of judicial reasoning and 
determination."' Lorrah, 761 P.2d at 1389 (quoting State v. Mossman, 75 Or.App. 385, 
706 P.2d 203, 204 (1985) (additional quotation omitted)). To determine whether the 
mistake is a clerical one, this Court looks to the record "to harmonize the intent of the 
[trial] court with the written judgment." Lorrah, 761 P.2d at 1389; State v. Shelby, 728 
P.2d 987, 987-88 (Utah 1986). 
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It is clear from the transcript of the change of plea hearing not only that the parties 
agreed that defendant would plead guilty to second degree burglary, but that defendant 
did, in fact, intend to enter such a plea and the trial court understood as much (R. 113-15; 
R. 291:3-4, 10). The State therefore agrees to correction of the record by removing the 
word "aggravated" as used in the final written judgment (R. 122-28). The State notes, 
however, that the trial court imposed the correct statutory sentence for a second degree 
burglary: one-to-fifteen years (R. 122-28). 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS DEFENDANT'S CALCULATION OF 
GENERAL DAMAGES FOR FORTY-ONE DAYS OF LOST 
WAGES, REQUIRING ADJUSTMENT OF THE AMOUNT 
ORDERED BY THE TRIAL COURT; HOWEVER, HE IDENTIFIES 
NO ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REIMBURSEMENT FOR 
"CHARGE-OFF" DAYS, AND HIS CHALLENGE TO THE 
PERSONAL PROPERTY AWARD IS NOT PROPERLY BEFORE 
THIS COURT 
Defendant raises several claims of error relating to the restitution award below. He 
claims that the restitution award should be reduced by a total of $ 770.37 to reflect a 
calculation error in lost wages demonstrated by the record evidence. Br. of Aplt. at 15-
23. The error, he claims, derives from the trial court's overestimation of the amount of 
lost wages generally, and the court's inclusion of payment for twelve "charge-off days 
and one additional day allegedly missed from work at Granite when none of the thirteen 
days were reimbursable. Id. He argues that the evidence supports reduction of the full 
amount awarded for all thirteen days because Deborah's conduct established that she 
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would not have worked both jobs on those days absent the injuries, and the school district 
was closed during one month, rendering payment of lost wages on all thirteen days 
improper. {Id. at 18-23). 
Defendant completes his argument by complaining that the restitution amount 
ordered for the victim's personal property losses improperly includes payment for 
deadbolt locks and maintenance service on an alarm system at Deborah's primary 
residence on Hazelhurst. Id. at 23-27. He claims that because he neither pled guilty to 
nor was charged with committing any offense at that address, he cannot be liable for 
payment of any security measures the victim may have taken at that address. Id. 
Only part of defendant's first claim has merit. The evidence fully supports 
defendant's calculation of restitution for the forty-one days of lost wages, requiring a 
slight adjustment to the restitution order. However, defendant fails to establish an abuse 
of discretion in ordering restitution for the twelve "charge-off days where the evidence 
amply supports the trial court's decision. Further, defendant did not preserve for appeal 
his challenge to the property damage award, nor did he include a plain error argument in 
his opening brief, permitting this Court to refuse to reach his argument. See State v. 
Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995) ("[T]he preservation rule applies to every 
claim . . . unless a defendant can demonstrate that 'exceptional circumstances' exist or 
'plain error' occurred. . . . If a defendant fails to argue exceptional circumstances or plain 
error justifies review on appeal, then 'we [will] decline to consider [the issue] on appeal." 
(citations omitted)). Even on the merits, the personal property award is fully justified by 
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the relationship between defendant, Deborah's primary residence, and the charged 
offenses. 
A. The Trial Court's Calculation of Lost Wages Generally Requires a Minor 
Adjustment 
The trial court determined that the prosecutor's restitution calculations contained 
in his written brief were representative of the evidence and issued an order detailing the 
various restitution amounts for which defendant was responsible (R. 191-93; R. 293:6-7). 
Add. D. However, a review of the prosecutor's calculations below and defendant's 
calculations on appeal reveals that defendant's calculations are more representative of the 
evidence adduced below. The prosecutor's calculations begin with what Deborah 
received from CVR and subtracts what the evidence showed she was not entitled to 
receive (R. 184-87). Defendant's calculations identify the amount of lost wages Deborah 
was owed for the days the evidence suggests she actually missed work, regardless of what 
she may have received from CVR. Br. of Aplt. at 17-18. 
Christine Ackmann, the reparation officer in charge of Deborah's claims, testified 
that CVR paid a total of $2,362.41 in lost wages to Deborah because of the two incidents 
charged in this case (R. 410: 3-4, 6). Ackmann established that Deborah worked an 
average of 5.8 hours per day at the school district, earned $12.48 per hour, and was paid 
by CVR for 66.66% of the amount she earned in order to account for taxes that would 
otherwise have been paid from her wages (R. 292: 24-25). 
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The prosecutor began his calculations for lost wages with the total amount paid by 
CVR, presuming its accuracy (R. 185-86). It is this presumption that accounts for the 
difference in how the prosecutor and the defendant calculate the amount to be paid. The 
prosecutor subtracted from the total paid to CVR the wages for "5 days that were not 
related to either of the two incidents . . . ." (R. 185-86). Those five days occurred 
between May 5 and May 30, prior to the first incident in this matter on June 14, 2000 (R. 
292:24). Multiplying the hours worked per day by the amount earned per hour, and 
rounding to two decimal places, provides a daily rate of pay amounting to S72.38.7 
Multiplying that daily rate by the five days that should not have been paid produces a 
figure of S361.90.8 CVR paid Deborah 66.66% of that amount for those five days (R. 
292: 24). The prosecutor calculated the amount paid to be $241.04 and subtracted that 
amount from the total paid by CVR to obtain the amount he claimed defendant should pay 
as restitution for general lost wages (R. 186).9 Accordingly, the prosecutor determined, 
and the trial court agreed, that the total amount paid for lost wages minus the five days 
that were unrelated to these incidents amounted to $2,121.37 (R. 186, 192).10 
75.8 hours per day x $12.48 per hour = $72.38 per day. 
8$72.38 per day x 5 days = $361.90 earned. 
9Carrying all calculations out two decimal places, the figure is more properly 
calculated at $ 241.24: $361.90 x 66.66% = $241.24. However, this slight difference is 
irrelevant here as defendant's calculations, not the prosecutor's, are more accurate as to 
lost wages in this case. 
10$2,362.41 paid by CVR - $ 241.04 for five days' overpayment = $2,121.37. 
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Defendant challenges that calculation, presenting what is a more appropriate 
calculation for lost wages. Br. of Aplt. at 17-18. He gathers the evidence relating to lost 
wages, determines the amount owed for each day of work missed, then multiplies that by 
the number of days the evidence established she actually missed, to arrive at a total figure 
that was owed to her for lost wages. Id. There is no dispute as to the daily rate paid by 
CVR: $48.25 per day, based on an average work day of 5.8 hours, a pay rate of $12.48 
per hour, and payment by CVR of 66.66 % of the total in lost wages (R. 186; R. 
292:24).n Br. of Aplt. at 18. There is also no dispute that the evidence showed Deborah 
missed forty-one days of work generally, including dates relating to surgery, recovery, 
pain, medical visits, and prosecution of the charges (R. 292:10-13) (for the reader's 
convenience, a chart of these dates is attached in Addendum E). Br. of Aplt. at 17-18.12 
Multiplying the daily rate of $48.25 by the forty-one missed days establishes that CVR 
should have paid the victim a total of $ 1,978.25 for these days.13 This is the amount 
arrived at by defendant. Id. at 18. 
The difference between the parties' calculations is that the prosecutor and trial 
court took what CVR said it had paid Deborah, presumed that the amount was justified, 
then subtracted the amounts paid for days of missed work that were not attributable to the 
M$12.48 per hour x 5.8 hrs per day x .6666 (rate paid by CVR) = $48.25. The 
prosecutor included these amounts at various points in his calculations below (R. 184-87). 
12Defendant goes on to challenge the propriety of including thirteen of those days. 
Br. of Aplt. at 18-23. See Point IIB for the State's response to defendant's challenge. 
1341 days x $48.25 per day = $1,978.25 owed by defendant. 
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charged incidents. Defendant, on the other hand, used the amounts and missed days as 
described by the witnesses below to calculate the amount owed based on the evidence 
presented. Defendant's calculations in this part of his brief are fully supported by the 
record evidence. The State agrees with defendant's determination that the restitution 
order for lost wages should have initially been calculated to be $1,978.25. 
In sum, the proper calculation for lost wages is as follows: 
$12.48 per hour x 5.8 hours per day x 66.66% = $48.25 per day of lost wages 
$48.25 x 41 lost days = $1,978.25 lost wages 
Hence, the restitution figured ordered by the trial court—$2,121.37—should be adjusted 
to $1,978.25. 
B. All "Charge-off" Days Were Properly Included in the Trial Court's 
Restitution Calculation 
The one argument preserved by defendant relating to restitution involves "charge-
off days. However, defendant's claim that Deborah was entitled to no recovery for 
twelve "charge-off' days does not accurately represent the evidence adduced below. Br. 
ofAplt. at 18-23.14 
14Defendant identifies twelve "charge-off days for which CVR compensated 
Deborah. Br. of Aplt. at 20-21. However, neither Oct. 27, 2000, nor Jan. 30, 2001, 
qualify as the last working day of those months (R. 292:59). See Add. E. 
Defendant also identifies one of those days—July 31, 2000—and an additional 
date when Deborah received compensation—July 18, 2001—as dates not warranting 
compensation because Deborah testified that Granite was a year-round school that closed 
during the month of July (R. 292:54-55). Id. at 18 & n.3, 21. However, there is no record 
evidence concerning how Granite employees were paid: whether they were paid only 
during the times they worked, or whether their salaries were adjusted to permit for 
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Deborah testified that the last working day of the month at Discover required 
intensive work by the account managers to collect outstanding accounts (R. 292:58-59). 
By 2:30 p.m. on those days, any accounts on which the account managers were not able 
to collect were forwarded to the legal department for further action (R. 292:59). The 
uncollectible accounts were, essentially, "charged-off' the account managers' books and 
were no longer the responsibility of those workers. Because the work had to be done by 
2:30, Deborah had routinely taken the day off from Granite School District so that she 
could make the necessary efforts to complete her job at Discover before 2:30 (R. 292: 
64). These days are what the parties describe as "charge-off days. 
At the restitution hearing on December 17, 2001, Deborah testified that the policy 
changed within "the last year-and-a-half, possibly closer to two years[.]" (R. 292:63). 
Instead of having to transfer the uncollectible accounts to the legal department at 2:30 
p.m., account managers were given until 7:45 p.m. to attempt to collect on their accounts 
(R. 292:64-65). Because of the extended time, Deborah could work her part-time shift at 
Granite School District, then go to Discover to work until time to transfer her 
uncollectible accounts at 7:45 p.m., if she choose to do so (R. 292: 65). 
Defendant argues that Deborah had ample opportunity before the first incident and 
after her recovery to work at both jobs during "charge-off days but never did. Br. of 
paychecks to be issued during the entire year, regardless of when the school was closed. 
Because defendant did not preserve this issue below and did not argue plain error on 
appeal, this Court should assume the regularity of the trial court's inclusion of these days 
in the restitution calculation. See Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1229 n.5. 
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Aplt. at 19-20, 22-23. He also contends that since her recovery ushe has never worked 
both jobs on 'charge-off days[.]" Id. at 20. Consequently, he contends, 'The history of 
Deborah's routine and common practice supports that she never would have worked at 
the school district on those ["charge-off] days." Id. at 21. Defendant claims that absent 
evidence that she would have actually worked both jobs subsequent to his infliction of her 
injuries, she cannot establish entitlement to any lost wages for those "charge-off' days, 
and he need not pay restitution for them. Id. 
The absence of any prior history of working both jobs is of little relevance here 
because the evidence shows that Deborah had little, if any, opportunity to establish such a 
"history" prior to being injured. The timing of the policy change which permitted her the 
opportunity to work both jobs is crucial. Deborah's testimony puts the policy change at 
or shortly before June 2000 (R. 292:63). The first incident in this case occurred June 14, 
2000 (R. 291: 8-9). "Charge-off days occurred on the last working day of each month 
(R. 292: 59). Consequently, defendant's argument that Deborah did not establish that she 
ever worked both jobs on "charge-off days prior to her first injuries does not 
demonstrate that she would not have worked the days in question here. More precisely, 
the evidence reasonably suggests that Deborah did not have an opportunity to work both 
jobs because the injuries occurred shortly after the policy change that would have allowed 
her to do so. Hence, the absence of any evidence that she worked both jobs on "charge-
off day prior to her injuries does not support defendant's argument that she was not 
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entitled to be paid during her recovery period for those days on which she could have 
worked both jobs. 
Further, Deborah testified that following infliction of the injuries, she tried to work 
both jobs, but could not "Due to the limitations of [her] wrist[,]" which was injured in the 
first incident (R. 292: 60-61, 65). She explained that, after telling her doctor what her 
jobs entailed, he admonished her "to avoid activity that would cause pain and swelling" 
(R. 292: 66). When asked if she could do both jobs in one day, she responded: 
No. No. I-I tried that. On days that I worked at the District and 
then worked at Discover Card in which I typed for any length of time, it 
would cause swelling of my wrist, so I knew that on charge-off day, where I 
absolutely had to do nothing but typing, I couldn't take breaks and do 
other—other work on these accounts, so I knew I had to do one or the other. 
So, I did do the charge-off day at Discover Card. 
(R. 292: 60-61). Hence, the evidence supports the trial court's implicit determination that 
the victim was unable to work both jobs on "charge-off days because of defendant's 
conduct, and that defendant therefore owed restitution for the lost wages paid to her as a 
result of those "charge-off days she was not able to work both jobs (R. 184-87, 191-93). 
Because defendant has failed to establish any abuse of discretion in the trial court's 
determination that he owed restitution for these "charge-off days, defendant's challenge 
necessarily fails. 
Moreover, defendant claims that Deborah was required to mitigate the damages 
flowing from her injuries. Br. of Aplt. at 16, 22. Because she could have, but did not, 
work at the school district on "charge-off days and take annual or sick leave from 
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Discover so the CVR would not have to pay restitution for these days, defendant claims 
Deborah did not adequately mitigate her losses and, hence, he need not pay restitution for 
the "charge-off days. Id. 
Deborah testified that her "charge-off day at Discover "requires constant phone 
calling and memoing on the accounts, which is very—was very stressful to [her] wrist. . . 
On charge-off day, I talk and I type." (R. 292: 59-60). As stressful as that may have been 
to her wrist, she also testified that at the school district, she was the lunch manager for an 
elementary school: 
. . . . I go in and I cook the food in very large ovens, with pans. 1 
serve the food, I prepare a lot of the food and I clean up at the end of the 
day. This, again, requires heavy use of my wrist, continuous use of my 
right [wrist], 'cause I am right-handed. 
(R. 292: 60). Nothing in the record establishes that a day of working at the school district 
was less taxing on her wrist than a day of calling and typing at Discover. Accordingly, 
there is no basis in the record evidence for defendant's claim that Deborah "chose to work 
the more stressful job" and was not entitled to reimbursement for lost wages from the 
school district because it was unreasonable of her not to forego her work at Discover for 
the school district job. Br. of Aplt. at 16, 22. To the contrary, Deborah met the 
mitigation requirement by getting out and working despite her injuries, and defendant has 
not established that the trial court's failure to require that she choose to work the job 
which saved the State the most money was plain error. 
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C. The Personal Property Claim is not Properly Before this Court; Regardless, it 
is Without Merit 
Defendant claims that the $ 916.00 amount ordered by the trial court as restitution 
for personal property loss to the victims is erroneously high. Br. of Aplt. at 23-27. He 
argues that he should not be required to pay for the servicing of the alarm system put into 
Deborah's primary residence on West Hazelhurst because the alarm was not installed as a 
result of the offenses to which he entered guilty pleas, and neither of those offenses 
occurred at that residence. Id. at 25-27. He claims that anything related to the alarm 
system at that address is irrelevant to these proceedings and cannot be included in the 
restitution calculation. Id. Because defendant did not raise this argument below when he 
mentioned "installation of the burglar alarm" prior to the first offense (R. 293: 3), and he 
made no other specific objection to payment of the post-June 14 service fee for the alarm 
system, his claim is not properly before this Court, and, absent any claim of plain error in 
his opening brief, this Court should refuse to reach it {see footnote 2, supra). See 
Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1229 n.5. 
Even under the plain error doctrine, defendant's claim is without merit. Under 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(4)(c)(i) (1999), the trial court can order payment of complete 
restitution, meaning "the restitution necessary to compensate a victim for all losses caused 
by the defendantf.]" See, e.g., State v. Corbitt, 2003 UT App 417, ^  12, Utah Adv. 
Rep. . Under subsection (8), the court may order restitution for the offense, including 
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"any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing court. . .." Utah 
Code Ann. §76-3-201(8). 
As a result of several incidences occurring after issuance of a protective order on 
May 4, 2001, Deborah had an alarm system installed in her primary residence on West 
Hazelhurst (R. 292: 32). That is the home owned jointly by Deborah and defendant (R. 
289, letter dated 1/22/01). The cost of the system, its installation, and its first service 
payment were incurred prior to the June 14 incident in this case and were reimbursed by 
CVR (R. 292: 15-18). After the June 14 incident, Deborah had deadbolts installed, either 
in her primary home or in her son's home, where she was living part of the time when she 
was attacked by defendant (R. 292: 14-20).I5 Following the July 11 incident, she 
purchased an alarm system for her son's home, together with a service agreement (R. 292: 
33-34). All the costs incurred with respect to the son's home were directly related to the 
charged incidents (id.). 
'•Defendant contends that the deadbolts were installed at Deborah's primary 
residence on Hazelburst. Br. of Aplt. at 24. Accordingly, he includes them in his 
argument that he is not responsible for security measures taken at that residence because 
it is unrelated to where he committed the crimes to which he pled guilty. Id. at 24-25, 27. 
However, the evidence is unclear as to whether the deadbolts were installed at her 
orimary residence or at her son's residence, where she was living periodically at the time 
Df the attacks (R. 292:14-20, 33-34). If they were installed at Deborah's primary 
•esidence, they are subject to the same argument as the alarm system service payments, 
md defendant's plain error claim that they should not have been included in the 
•estitution amount ordered by the trial court would fail. See text, infra. If they were 
nstalled at defendant's son's home, where both crimes took place, his plain error claim as 
o them also fails. 
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The trial court ordered defendant to pay $ 916 in restitution "for payments made to 
Debra [sic] Diviney for the expense of installing an alarm system and the expense of 
quarterly fees associated with two alarm systems[.]" (R. 192). Add. D. This amount was 
derived from the prosecutor's restitution brief In that brief, the prosecutor makes it clear 
that he did not include within that amount the cost of buying and installing the first alarm 
system in Deborah's primary residence on Hazelhurst ($494.00) or the cost of the first 
service payment ($ 82) (R. 184-87). Add. C. Deborah testified that the system was 
installed as the result of prior conduct by defendant (R. 292:31-32). Consequently, the 
prosecutor and the trial court omitted from the final restitution calculation the purchase 
and installation of the system prior to the June 14 incident as well as the first maintenance 
payment (R. 184-87, 192). Add. C and D, respectively. 
However, Deborah also testified that the continuance of the alarm system after 
June 14 was related to the June 14 incident (R. 292: 33). At the time of that incident, 
Deborah was living at the Hazelhurst address where the first alarm had been installed (R. 
292: 33). After a series of events occurred involving defendant and the Hazelhurst 
address, Deborah began to live both in her own home and in her son's home on Royal 
Harvest Way (R. 292: 34). She preferred to stay at her own home but did not feel that she 
could fully secure it and, hence, felt uncomfortable staying there alone (R. 292: 34-35). 
Because Deborah lived at that residence periodically and maintained an ownership 
interest in it, and because of her undeniable need for protection from defendant given his 
ability to find her and attack her at the home of one of her sons and given his history of 
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protective order violations toward Deborah, it was not plain error for the trial court to 
include in the restitution order payment for the continued service of the alarm system at 
that address (R. 289, letter dated 1/22/01; R. 292: 10, 32-34).16 The reasonableness of 
that determination was later made clear by evidence suggesting that defendant later 
frequented the area in which Deborah lived and may have been responsible for damage to 
the home and a car parked outside the home (R. 203-05, 227-28; R. 411). Hence, 
defendant's claim of plain error fails. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court correct the 
clerical error in the Judgment's reference to the charge of "aggravated" burglary. The 
State also requests that this Court reduce the restitution amount as to lost wages from 
$2,121.37 to $1,978.25. Finally, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm 
defendant's convictions, sentences, and restitution responsibility in all other respects. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 5 ^ _ day of December, 2003. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Assistant Attorney General 
16Service for each of the alarm systems amounted to $ 90.00 for each quarter 
hrough the first year (R. 292: 22). 
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Titles 76 and 77 
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SENTENCING 
76-3-201. Definitions — Sentences or combination of sen-
tences allowed — Civil penalties — Restitution 
— Hearing. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Conviction" includes a: 
(i) judgment of guilt; and 
(ii) plea of guilty. 
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is 
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits 
responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of 
committing the criminal conduct. 
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general 
damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil 
action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's 
criminal activities and includes the money equivalent of property taken, 
destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings 
and medical expenses. 
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary 
damages to a victim, including the accrual of interest from the time of 
sentencing, insured damages, and payment for expenses to a governmen-
tal entity for extradition or transportation and as further defined in 
Subsection (4He). 
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has 
suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendants criminal 
activities. 
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's 
criminal activities. 
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a 
person convicted of an offense to any one of the following sentences or 
combination of them: 
(a) to pay a fine; 
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office; 
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law; 
(d) to imprisonment; 
(e) to life imprisonment; 
(f) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or 
(g) to death. 
(3) (a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law 
to: 
(i) forfeit property; 
(ii) dissolve a corporation; 
(iii) suspend or cancel a license; 
(iv) permit removal of a person from office; 
(v) cite for contempt; or 
(vi) impose any other civil penalty, 
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence. 
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(4) (a) (i) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted 
in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may 
impose, the court shaii order that the defendant make restitution to 
victims of crime as provided in this subsection, or for conduct for 
which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea 
agreement. For purposes of restitution, a victim has the meaning as 
defined in Subsection (l)(e). 
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court 
shall follow the criteria and procedures as provided in Subsections 
(4)(c) and (4)(d). 
(iii) If the court finds the defendant owes restitution, the clerk of 
the court shall enter an order of complete restitution as defined in 
Subsection (8Kb) on the civil judgment docket and provide notice of 
the order to the parties. 
(iv) The order is considered a legal judgment enforceable under the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the person in whose favor the 
restitution order is entered may seek enforcement of the restitution 
order in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In 
addition, the Department of Corrections may, on behalf of the person 
in whose favor the restitution order is entered, enforce the restitution 
order as judgment creditor under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(v) If the defendant fails to obey a court order for payment of 
restitution and the victim or department elects to pursue collection of 
the order by civil process, the victim shall be entitled to recover 
reasonable attorney's fees. 
(vi) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a lien when re-
corded in a judgment docket and shall have the same effect and is 
subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil action. 
Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of sentenc-
ing. 
(vii) The Department of Corrections shall make rules permitting 
the restitution payments to be credited to principal first and the 
remainder of payments credited to interest in accordance with Title 
63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(b) (i) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77, 
Chapter 30, Extradition, to resolve pending criminal charges and is 
convicted of criminal activity in the county to which he has been 
returned, the court may, in addition to any other sentence it may 
impose, order that the defendant make restitution for costs expended 
by any governmental entity for the extradition. 
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court 
shall consider the criteria in Subsection (4)(c). 
(c) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete 
restitution and court-ordered restitution. 
(i) Complete restitution means the restitution necessary to com-
pensate a victim for all losses caused by the defendant. 
(ii) Court-ordered restitution means the restitution the court hav-
ing criminal jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the 
criminal sentence at the time of sentencing. 
(iii) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be 
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(d) (i) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inap-
propriate under this subsection, the court shall make the reasons for 
the decision a part of the court record. 
(ii) In any civil action brought by a victim to enforce the judgment, 
the defendant shall be entitled to offset any amounts that have been 
paid as part of court-ordered restitution to the victim. 
(iii) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a lien when re-
corded in a judgment docket and shall have the same effect and is 
subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil action. 
Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of sentenc-
ing. 
(iv) The Department of Corrections shall make rules permitting the 
restitution payments to be credited to principal first and the remain-
der of payments credited to interest in accordance with Title 63, 
Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(e) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of 
the restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow the 
defendant a full hearing on the issue. 
(5) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court 
shall order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transporta-
tion expenses if the defendant was: 
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another 
within the state at governmental expense to resolve pending criminal 
charges; 
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and 
(iii) convicted of a crime. 
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of 
governmental transportation expenses if any of the following apply: 
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent 
failure to appear a warrant is issued for an infraction; or 
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order. 
(c) (i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Sub-
section (5)(a)(i) shall be calculated according to the following schedule: 
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported; 
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported; 
and 
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported, 
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (5)(c)(i) applies to 
each defendant transported regardless of the number of defendants 
actually transported in a single trip. 
(6) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that 
one of three stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order 
imposition of the term of middle severity unless there are circumstances in 
aggravation or mitigation of the crime. 
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a 
statement identifying circumstances in aggravation or mitigation or 
presenting additional facts. If the statement is in writing, it shall be filed 
with the court and served on the opposing party at least four days prior to 
the time set for sentencing. 
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify impo-
sition of the highest or lowest term, the court may consider the record in 
the case, the probation officer's report, other reports, including reports 
received under Section 76*-.'M0'l, statements in aggravation or mitigation 
submitted by the prosecution or the defendant, and any further evidence 
introduced at the sentencing hearing 
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and 
reasons for imposing the upper or lower term. 
(e) In determining a just sentence, the court shall consider sentencing 
guidelines regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances promul-
gated by the Sentencing Commission. 
f 7) I f during the commission of a crime described as child kidnaping, rape of 
a child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or sexual abuse of a child, 
the defendant causes substantial bodily injury to the child, and i f the charge is 
set forth in the information or indictment and admitted by the defendant, or 
found true by a judge or jury at tr ia l , the defendant shall be sentenced to the 
highest minimum term in state prison. This subsection takes precedence over 
any conflicting provision of law. 
(8) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense 
shall include any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the 
sentencing court or to which the defendant agrees to pay restitution. A 
victim of an offense, that involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or 
a pattern of criminal activity, includes any person directly harmed by the 
defendants criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or 
pattern. 
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete 
restitution, the court shall consider all relevant facts, including: 
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage 
to or loss or destruction of property of a victim of the offense; 
f i i ) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services 
and devices relating to physical, psychiatric, and psychological care, 
including nonmedical care and treatment rendered in accordance wi th 
a method of healing recognized by the law of the place of treatment; 
the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and rehabili-
tat ion; and the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the 
offense resulted in bodily injury to a victim; and 
(ii i) the cost of necessary funeral and related services i f the offense 
resulted in the death of a victim 
(c) I n determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-
ordered restitution, the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsec-
tion (8Kb) and. 
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that 
payment of restitution will impose, with regard to the other obliga-
tions of the defendant; 
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment 
basis or on other conditions to be fixed by the court; 
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of 
restitution and the method of payment; and 
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines make restitu-
tion inappropriate. 
(d) The court may decline to make an order or may defer entering an 
order of restitution if the court determines that the complication and 
prolongation of the sentencing process, as a result of considering an order 
PUN fSWlfPNTS 7(i-:t-2()l 
of restitution under this subsection, substantially outweighs the need to 
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ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES 
76-5-102. Assault. 
(1) Assault is: 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to 
another; 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do 
bodily injury to another; or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, t ha t causes or 
creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another. 
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor. 
(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if: 
(a) the person causes substantial bodily injury to another; or 
(b) the victim is pregnant and the person has knowledge of the 
pregnancy 
(4) It is not a defense against assault, that the accused caused serious bodily 






Titles 76 and 77 
76-5-103. Aggravated assault. 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in 
Section 76-5-102 and he: 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or 
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection 
(lXa), uses a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other 
means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury. 
(2) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is a second degree felony. 
(3) A violation of Subsection (1Kb) is a third degree felony. 
76-5-108. Protective orders restraining abuse of another 
— Violation. 
(1) Any person who is the respondent or defendant subject to a protective 
order or ex parte protective order issued under Title 30, Chapter 6, Cohabitant 
Abuse Act, or Title 78, Chapter 3a, Juvenile Court Act of 1996, Title 77, 
Chapter 36, Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act, or a foreign protective order as 
described in Section 30-6-12, who intentionally or knowingly violates that 
order after having been properly served, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor, 
except as a greater penalty may be provided in Title 77, Chapter 36, 
Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act. 
(2) Violation of an order as described in Subsection < 1) is a domestic violence 
offense under Section 77-36-1 and subject to increased penalties in accordance 
with Section 77-36-1.1. 
76-6-202. Burglary. 
(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a 
building or any portion of a building with intent to commit a felony or theft or 
commit an assault on any person. 
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was committed in a 
dwelling, in which event it is a felony of the second degree. 
Addendum B 
Addendum B 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
E STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
CA^'i^J^t^ i> (V, njL^y 
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
(COMMITMENT) TO 






Honorable Nrc CH.^L 
Clerk \ N \ f t 
Reporter 
Bailiff _ 
Date _ (T&gLq-g*. ^--^o-oi 
he motion of. . to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
>ose sentence accordingly is • granted • denied. There being no. legal or other reason why sentence 
)lea of guilty; D plea 
bxuut (J\\\ASA ^ a n d the State being represented by "pCXYNg 
fv adjudged guilty of the above offense, 
and represented by 
U^Cy-n is 
:fs now sentenced to a term in the Salt Lake County Jail, 
'o i_2 5 months; 
and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $ 
^and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $. . t s ttf^e \o VXWPA\^ 
g \N c Q \ X Y S ,such sentence is to run concurrently with 
such sentence is to run consecutively with 
upon motion of • State,D Defense, D Court, Count(s) are hereby dismissed. 
Defendant is granted a stay of the above (D jail) sentence and placed on probation in the custody of this 
Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult Probation and 
'Pfcirole for the period of pursuant to the attached conditions of probation, ... _ 
Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County, to be confined and 
imprisoned in the Salt Lake County Jail in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. 
Commitment shall issue A • ' . • - • • - / • 
if 
3R0VED AS TO FORM: 
ftCA^ 
DATED this day of i8to£si *ac!0\ 
Defense Counsel 
T>. V\o\Cvn CTION OF JUDGE 
Deputy County Attorney Page of 
Judgment/Sentence_ 
- A J ^ 
CONDITIONS OF PROBATION 
. /Honorable AW' -Cc . . . 
ct'i </ / 7tS>>~ 




X2. a Serve 
in the Salt Lake County Jail commencing. 
• Pay a fine in the amount of $ D at a rate to be determined by the Department of Adult Probation and 
Parole; n at a rate of
 s . 
i ^ P a y restitution in the amount of $ ; or&Jn an amount to be determined by the Department of Adult 
Probation and Parole; D at a rate of. 
, the Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
i s * Enter, participate in, and complete any 
or D at a rate to be determined by 
program, counseling, or treatment as 
directed by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
D Enter, participate in, and complete the program at 
a Participate in and complete any a educational; and/or D vocational training n as directed by the 
Department of Adult Probation and Parole; or D with 
D Participate in and complete any training D as directed by the Department of Adult 
Probation and Parole; or a with 
a Submit person, residence, and vehicle to search and seizure for the detection of drugs. 
-BL Submit to drug testing. 
qMMot associate with anyone who illegally uses, sells, or otherwise distributes narcotics or drugs. 
D Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise distributed illegally, 
q Not use or possess non-prescribed controlled substances. 
& Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages. 
•^s Submit to testing for alcohol use. 
D Take antabuse a as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
f Obtain and maintain full-time employment. Maintain full-time employment or obtain and maintain full-time schooling. 
>Q Defendant is to have no contact nor associate with \J{chrvu3 . 
a Defendant's probation may be transferred to under the Interstate Compact as approved 
by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
• Complete hours of community service restitution as directed by the Department of Adult Probation 
and Parole. 
Complete .hours of community service restitution in lieu of. 
;Q^ Defendant is to commit no crimes. 
a Defendant is ordered to appear before this Court on 
•
 m _ _ _ 
a 
D 
.days in jail. 
'Art • 
for a review of this sentence. 
W U 
^t t } o 
DATED t h i s ^ ^ d a y nf V ) n tQ^CTA *r 
Page. of 
- . .MP UC-fID AT DIRECTION OF JUDGE 
Pu^rt 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




Case No. CO i c\ i 1 C A S" 
•h-t\i.~ ~^-\-'I\-A,\ I Count No 3 






The motion of to enter a judgement of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
pose sentence accordingly in • granted • denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
ould not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by • a jury; • the court^/Stf plea of guilty; 
plea of no contest; of the offense of A a Q\
 t VJ^-J /.u.u_ t , a felony 
the O degree, • a class misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and 
)resented by fLoUc± L\\ \^t>\^ad the State being represented by £ V^L \C^>is now adjudged guilty 
the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison: 
3 to a maximum mandatory term of years and which may be life; 
2 / not to exceed five years; 
3^ of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; C^^^y 
2 of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
D not to exceed years; 
D and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $ ;
 n y * . 
tL and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $ tr>. 
flw such sentence is to run concurrently with ( X \ \ C l A ^ C V v S 
 t  i  t   tl  it  
2 such sentence is to run consecutively with 
2 upon motion of • State, • Defense, • Court(s) are hereby dismissed. 
D . 
&-' Defendant is granted a stay of above (^kprison ) sentence and placed on probation in the custody of 
this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult Parole for the 
* period of , pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
Y Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County • for delivery to the 
Utah State Prison, Draper, Utah, or £>4or delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shaJ^be 
confined and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. 
J; Commitment shall issue ^ 
DATED this r j f f l day of C - f f i l ^ , t ^ C D \ 
PROVED AS TO FORM: 
Defense Counsel 
-\>. \V>\&\^ 
Deputy County Attorney Page of 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 





SALT LAKE COUNTY JAIL 
(J\Cw\tt> b^'tVW, 
% 









Date qoga&Kfrr M-??0-Cl 
D The motion of. . to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly is • granted • denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by D a jury; • the court Jgfplea of guilty; • plea 
of no contest; of the offense of <n'm|?|< &A^C\Ak[t . 
a class o 2 _ misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and represented by 
£w<t< fllfy/X/S^ and the State being represented by T X > X \ l v \ o <\r\ , is 
now adjudged guilty of the above offense, 
ntenced to a term in the Salt Lake County Jail, 
months; 
D and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $. 
"E**and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $. teL frfoPto d**^*^ 
OA\ f.CA;{Vg: ^^such sentence is to run concurrently with . 
h such sentence is to run consecutively with 
D upon motion of D State, D Defense. D Court, Count(s) _. are hereby dismissed. 
D Defendant is granted a stay of the above (D jail) sentence and placed on probation in the custody of this 
Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult Probation and 
Parole for the period of pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
*£ Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County, to be confined and 
/ imprisoned in the Salt Lake County Jail in accordance with this Judgment and Comm 
p< Commitment shall issue ><r 
DATED this 





D . frV>\cw> 
Deputy County Attorney Page of 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 






00 i (1 \aoz±~ 
H o n o r a h l f l ~ / ^ C&~4 
Clerk ^ j j £ 
Reporter. 
Bailiff 
Date ft»-Sfi**g\ ^\^C Cy\ 
The motion of. . to enter a judgement of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
>ose sentence accordingly in • granted Q denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
>uld not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by • a jury; • the court, S^ plea of guilty; 
plea of no contest; of the offense of ^ ^ QiM c \J(r^A^i „
 t a felony 
he jAiMdegree, • a class misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and 
resented by n-iuu D l i ^ ^ ^ r a n d the State being represented by"h Uo\CM> , is now adjudged guilty 




to a maximum mandatory term of 
not to exceed five years; 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; 
of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
not to exceed years; 
and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $ 
and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $ 
fcSftNVjWrs WC\ aft \a 
years and which may be life; 
CSS 
v. ..-ffivP-to Htekcrtv^ 
such sentence is to run concurrently with Q l \ L X COOCW^—> ^\ 
such sentence is to run consecutively with. 
upon motion of • State, • Defense, • Court(s 
 ti  f u st t , U f , U t ] are hereby dismissed. 
t rw—<«_* : *^ ~ ~*«t. ~t « u — /^a^orison ) sentence and placed on probation in the custody of ^ » ^ i V T Defendant is granted a stay of above 
this Court and under the supervision 
period of. 
f the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult Parole for the 
pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
/ 
Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake Counttyfil^pr delivery to the 
Utah State Prison, Draper, Utah, o^St^for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where c^f ldsnt sffett^ be 
confined and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. / X : . ••'"• 
Commitment shall issue <7-f} J^rO^ \ 
DATED this. . day of 
IOVED AS TO FORM: 
DISTRICT O 
Defense Counsel 
> v\cton •jr. 30 Deputy County Attorney 
CIS 
VS 
Third District Court, State of Utah 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
S+aft 
Plaintiff 







en* NO. JL°131M<* r 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO ANY PEACE OFFICER IN THE STATE OF UTAH: 
36 On the. day of 
^ 
A*K r-^ >" ,the above 
named defendant was brought before a judge of the District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
charged with having committed the crime 
-h t 
luge ui inc UI&IXIV;I i*uuri, o a i i UCIKC t^uuuiy, o ia i c ui u i a n , 
neH>f and to serve The defendant was found guilty and was sentenced to pay a fi xr  $ 
. days in the County Jail with * — ^ days in jail to be suspended upon payment of 
the fine on or before ^^^ ; 
The fine has not been paid, nor secured, nor has an appeal been taken; 
You are hereby commanded to take said defendant into custody and safely keep until he/she shall serve 
out the above-named term of imprisonment or shall pay $ not to exceed one day 
for each —-* of the fine. 
Dated 
-Bj^J 3-6 .. ^M. I 
£< 
W may b* -^^^4 & ec^. 
^TAMP USED A 
Addendum C 
Addendum C 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
C. DANE NOLAN 4891 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)363-7900 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CHARLES LEE DIVINEY, 
Defendant. 
BRIEF ON RESTITUTION ISSUES 
CASE NO. 001912025 
JUDGE SHEILA K. McCLEVE 
The State of Utah, by and through its counsel, C. Dane Nolan, Salt Lake County 
Deputy District Attorney, hereby respectfully submits the following Brief on Restitution 
Issues in the above captioned matter: 
1. Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 76-3-201 (1953 as amended) the Court, in a 
criminal case, is required to order that the defendant make restitution to the victims of his 
crime. A victim is any person whom the court determines has suffered pecuniary 
damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities. The legislature, in subsection 
8, stated that the Court should consider all relevant facts including the cost of the damage 
or loss to property, the cost of necessary medical and related professional services, 
devices relating to physical, psychiatric, psychological care, including non-medical care 
and treatment rendered in accordance with a method of healing recognized by the law of 
the place of treatment; the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and 
rehabilitation; and the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the offense 
resulted in bodily injury to the victim. 
2. Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 77-18-1 (1953 as amended) the Court, can, 
as a condition of probation, require the defendant to make restitution to the victims, with 
interest. 
3. The defendant in this case was sentenced on April 30, 2001 - at that time the 
Court ordered that he pay restitution to the victims as a condition of being placed on 
probation. Subsequently the Court has conducted hearings and taken evidence on the 
issue as to what the amount of restitution is. 
4. The State submits that the following amounts should appropriately be ordered 
as restitution: 
-$554 to Crime Victims Reparations for medical expenses such as co-
payments and prescriptions that were not covered by Debra Diviney's health insurer, 
IHC. 
-$2121.37 to Crime Victims Reparations for payments made to Debra 
Diviney for lost wages. This has been calculated as follows. The testimony during the 
hearings was that Crime Victims Reparations paid Debra Diviney $2362.41 for lost 
wages. That amount included 5 days that were not related to either of the two incidents 
that led to the defendant being charged and convicted. The rate of pay was $12.48 per 
hour. The number of hours was 5.8 per day. Only 66% of the product was paid to Debra 
Diviney to take into account that had she worked and earned pay for those days she 
would have had to pay taxes at a rate of approximately 34%. $12.48 x 5.8 hours x 5 days 
x 66% = $241.04. $2362.41 minus $241.04 = $2121.37. 
--$8.00 to Crime Victims Reparations for payments made to Debra 
Diviney for travel expenses. 
--$916 to Crime Victims Reparations for payments made to Debra Diviney 
for the expense of installing an alarm system and the expense of quarterly fees associated 
with two alarm systems. The testimony during the hearings was that Debra Diviney had 
an alarm system installed prior to the incidents that led to the defendant being charged 
and convicted and then had a second alarm system installed afterwards. The total amount 
of the installation costs and quarterly fees for the two systems was $1447. The cost of 
installation and non-qualifying fees of the first system was $531 ($449 plus $82). $1447 -
$531 =$916. 
-$299.05 to Crime Victims Reparations for payments made to Chuck 
Diviney III for lost wages. This individual testified that he suffered bodily injury as a 
result of being attacked by his father. 
5. The State requests that the defendant pay interest on the above amounts from 
the date of sentencing, April 30, 2001. 
6. The State also gives notice that it intends to seek full restitution for all 
anticipated future payments made by Crime Victims Reparations, including costs 
associated with Debra Diviney's anticipated wrist and hand surgery, and payments made 
to Chuck Diviney III for lost wages in 2001. 
7. The State also gives notice that it intends to seek full restitution for all 
anticipated future payments made by Debra Diviney's health insurer, IHC, for costs and 
expenses associated with her anticipated wrist and hand surgery. 
Dated this 27th day of December, 2001. 
*e Nolan 
District Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that the above and foregoing was delivered to Bruce Oliver, 180 
South 300 West #210, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101, on the 27th day of December, 2001, 




DAVE) E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
C.DANE NOLAN 4891 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)363-7900 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CHARLES LEE DIVINEY, 
Defendant. 
ORDER OF RESTITUTION 
CASE NO. 001912025 
JUDGE SHEILA K. McCLEVE 
The above captioned matter having come before the Court on the 4' day of 
February, 2002, relating to the issue of restitution, the State of Utah being represented by 
its counsel, C. Dane Nolan, Salt Lake County Deputy District Attorney, the defendant 
having been present and represented by his counsel, Bruce Oliver, the Court having 
previously taken testimony, the Court having entertained oral argument, and the Court 
now being fully advised, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, 
1. That the defendant is to pay, as restitution, the following amounts; 
-$554.00 to the office of Crime Victim's Reparations for medical expenses 
such as co-payments and prescriptions that were not covered by Debra 
Diviney's health insurer, 
-$2121.37 to Crime Victims Reparations for payments made to Debra 
Diviney for lost wages, 
-$8.00 to Crime Victims Reparations for payments made to Debra Diviney 
for travel expenses, 
-$916 to Crime Victims Reparations for payments made to Debra Diviney for 
the expense of installing an alarm system and the expense of quarterly fees 
associated with two alarm systems, and 
-499.05 to Crime Victims Reparations for payments made to Chuck Diviney 
III for lost wages. 
2. The defendant is ordered to pay interest on the above amounts from the date of 
sentencing, April 30, 2001. 
Dated this ^<r day of 
SH 
Third District J 
i«\ 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that the above and foregoing was delivered to Bruce Oliver, 180 
South 300 West #210, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101, on thfe^^W day of February, 2002, 
through the United States Postal Service. 
Addendum E 
Addendum E 
DATES OFF WORK* REASONS FOR ABSENCE* NO. OF WORKING DAYS 
June 15-21, 2000 
June 30, 2000 
July 31, 2000 
August 31, 2000 
September 7, 2000 
September 29, 2000 
October 20, 2000 
October 25, 2000 
October 27, 2000 
November 30, 2000 
December 4, 2000 









larch 26, 2001 
larch 30, 2001 
.pril 30, 2001 
lay 31, 2001 
me 4, 2001 
ine 18-28,2001 
me 29, 2001 
ily 18,2001 
injuries to hand 
pain/swelling in hand; charge-
pain/swelling in hand; charge-
pain/swelling in hand; charge-
court hearing 




visit to doctor; charge-off 
hand surgery 





pain in hand 
pain in hand 
pain in hand; charge-off 
in court 
pain in hand 
pain in hand 
pain in hand; charge-off 
pain in hand; charge-off 
pain in hand; charge-off 
in court 





recovery from surgery; charge-off 


































\\\ of these dates and the reasons provided for each are based on the testimony of 
iristine Ackmann when she summarized the dates for which CVR compensated 
iborah (R. 292: 10-13). Counsel for the State has added the "charge-off' notations for 
>se dates provided by Ackmann's testimony which fall on the last working day of the 
mth. A similar listing appears in defendant's opening brief. Br. of Aplt. at 18-20. 
